Venue Shift Following Devolution: When Reserved Meets

Devolved in Scotland
Intergovernmental Relations and Multi-Level Governance
A common theme of devolution and federalism studies is the entanglement of policy issues when decision-making power is vested in more than one actor. Although most political systems outline in detail the policy domains of each level or type of government, it is inevitable that the boundaries between policy areas will become blurred in practice.
There are two relevant approaches to this area of study. The first -widespread in the literature on intergovernmental relations -highlights country level differences according to institutional structures, power and the recourse to established authority and formal resolution. This literature may be used to explore the structure of UK relations -is it a unitary or union state? Can it be meaningfully compared with federal, quasi-federal or other devolved unions? What is the strength of the centre and what is the frequency of formal dispute resolution? (e.g. Mitchell, 2003; Watts, forthcoming; Horgan, 2004; Agranoff, 2004) . The second -associated with the literature on multi-level governance -highlights informal relationships and the blurring of boundaries between public/ private action and levels of governmental sovereignty. Decision-making authority is dispersed and policy outcomes are determined by a complex series of negotiations between state and private interests (see e.g. Bache and Flinders, 2004a; 2004b; Hooghe and Marks, 2003a; 2003b) .
A combination of approaches highlights a more widespread finding in the political science literature -that the identification of power in terms of capacity is limited without demonstration of the exercise of power (Hindess, 1995) . This includes the overt use of power to make decisions in the face of opposition. It also includes discussions of agenda-setting and the exercise of power to limit the scope of those decisions. As Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 32) suggest, this often involves competition to define policy problems in a certain way to ensure that they are dealt with in a particular decision making 'venue'. The focus of analysis moves, from the capacity to make decisions, to the level of government in which the decisions are made. Therefore, the complexity of governance arrangements and subsequent competition to ensure decision-making jurisdiction makes it difficult to predict policy outcomes from the analysis of institutional arrangements alone. This reinforces the need for case study analysis -by country to explore the effect of institutions and formal arrangements, by policy area to ensure that relationships identified in one field are not atypical, and over time to explore the shifting boundaries between policy areas. To address a tendency to interpret intergovernmental outcomes in terms of the powers of its dominant participants, these case studies should also present competing 'narratives' of policy change (see Bevir and Rhodes, 1999) .
This article outlines the case of Scotland and the factors underlying its legislative relationship with the UK since 1999. The findings support two narratives of policy development. First, the most common means to address blurred legislative boundaries has been the 'Sewel motion' which gives Scottish Parliamentary consent for Westminster to legislate. The UK arena is therefore the most likely venue for decision making or dispute resolution. This supports a 'top-down' narrative of UK dominance, which suggests that the informality of intergovernmental relations is based on a balance of power towards Whitehall. Second, there is scope for policy autonomy through shifting the boundaries of the devolution settlement. This supports a 'bottom-up' narrative which highlights a strategy of reframing and downplaying issues to ensure that they are dealt with in a devolved decision-making venue. A combination of narratives suggests that while UK power is often exaggerated by focussing on a very small number of visible conflicts, the scope for Scottish success depends on political will, the level of UK interest, and the strength or visibility of the agenda surrounding each policy issue.
Reserved and Devolved Areas in Scotland
The Scotland Act 1998 specifies which matters are reserved. Devolved matters are those areas not specified in the Act, as well as some extra powers granted on an ad hoc basis (such as the Scottish rail network in 2004). (Rhodes et al, 2003: 97) . Early confusion over competence was also exploited. As Parry and Jones (2000) discuss, the lack of a dedicated industry minister in Greer, 2005a and 2005b) .
Medical training and regulation are reserved and groups such as the medical Royal Colleges still focus on the UK.
 The role of professions ensures that devolved areas such as higher education and social work maintain a UK focus.
 UK involvement in Scottish policy is furthered by the reserved nature of the civil service as well as cross-cutting or 'joined up government' initiatives and the reservation of fiscal policy and social security. For example, housing policy is devolved but housing benefit and funding for supported housing is reserved, while
Treasury rules on local authority borrowing constrain any alternative to housing stock transfer.
 Although the Scottish Executive may attempt to address fuel poverty, it can only influence levels of insulation and heating in homes, not the price of fuel or the level of income tax/ benefits.
 The means to address matters such as child poverty in Scotland also operates within the context of reserved income tax and benefits regimes. Many policy responses are second order, focussing on access to devolved public services.
 The overlap of responsibilities is most apparent in the implementation of reserved policies by devolved services. For example, the Home Office directs Scottish local authorities on immigration and controls the use of 'dawn raids' by police forces when removing unsuccessful asylum seekers (Cairney, 2006a: 19) .
As Keating discusses (2005: 18; see also Simeon, 2003: 216) , these issues of territorial politics are common to modern federal systems with the dual aim of devolving decisions and maintaining central control when appropriate. The differences arise in country-level structures and the means used to address these overlaps. In the UK the unusual nature of the former affects the latter. The UK is asymmetrical in two senses -first because devolution was extended to a relatively small share of the population, with Scotland (8.6
per cent), Wales (4.9 per cent) and Northern Ireland (2.9 per cent) accounting for 16.4 per cent; and second because the balance of power is tipped towards UK policy departments dealing predominantly with the English population. As Keating (2005: 120) suggests, the centre is faced with a small set of devolved governments which do not match the powers of federated or devolved authorities in other countries such as Germany, Spain, Belgium or Canada. Scotland is not part of a collection of powerful regions and the UK does not have a 'supreme constitution' guaranteeing a level of autonomy for devolved governments (Watts, forthcoming) .
In the UK, intergovernmental relations are conducted almost entirely through executives (rather than parliaments) and while there are formal mechanisms to resolve disputes, the tendency is not to use them. There have been no references of Scottish bills to judicial review since this is treated as a last resort and the Scottish Executive is more likely to 'remove offending sections' than face delay (Page, 2005) . The Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) was designed to allow central government to call a meeting with the territories to discuss issues of working arrangements, the impact of devolved policy on reserved areas and vice versa, share experience and consider disputes. However, this has also met infrequently (Trench, 2004 (Keating, 2005: 122-3) .
The role of parties in IGR varies considerably, from Canada with a devolved party structure and differentiated party competition by territory, to Germany which has integrated parties and formal links to coordinate policy (Horgan, 2004: 122 UK party direction. Therefore, the informal use of IGR through parties may reflect a desire to avoid political embarrassment and present a united front rather than a means to secure convergence in policy aims.
The top-down narrative: intergovernmental relations, disputes and Sewel motions
The top-down narrative suggests that this informality in IGR is based on a balance of power towards Whitehall and Scottish reluctance to risk its position by pursuing conflicting interests in public. Trench (2004: 513) suggests that the lack of JMC meetings reflects UK disinterest: '… a clear indicator that devolution is no longer a prime concern of the Prime Minister and other politicians … they have disentangled themselves from devolution ' (2004: 515-6) . Similarly, Keating (2005: 125) suggests that actors in
Whitehall often forget about Scotland and neglect to consult, then make statements on UK policy without a Scottish qualification or opt-out. The structure and frequency of IGR may therefore be more about UK dominance than consensus.
This imbalance of power is apparent when disputes rise to the surface. The most high profile policy of the first Scottish Parliament session (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) was the decision in Scotland to depart from the UK line and implement the recommendations of the Sutherland Report on 'free' personal care for the elderly. The practical effect was to give a non-means-tested payment of £145 per person per week for those who qualified for personal care and an extra £65 for those who qualified for nursing care (Keating et al, 2003) . However, these payments removed the entitlement of recipients to the UK Attendance Allowance (£38-56) and the Treasury refused to give their saving to the Scottish Executive (£22 million). As Simeon (2003: 225) suggests, if the UK government had been sympathetic to the policy a solution would have been found, but
general Whitehall indifference to Scotland had turned to specific hostility (particularly since UK ministers failed to persuade their Scottish counterparts to maintain a UK line).
This approach was also taken with the issue of Hepatitis C compensation in Scotland, with the Department of Work and Pensions threatening to reduce benefit payments to those in receipt of Scottish Executive compensation (Lodge, 2003) . This case was taken further, with Whitehall delaying Scottish payments on the basis of competence (health devolved, but compensation for injury and illness reserved) until it came up with a UKwide scheme to be implemented in Scotland.
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Scottish policy on higher education fees also marked a clear departure from the UK line, but the extent of divergence was constrained by reserved elements. The Scottish Executive proposed to allow students to defer a £2000 payment until they had reached a certain income level following graduation. While a key recommendation of the Cubie Report (on which the policy was based) was a repayment of 2% of income at an income level of £25000, this was constrained by existing arrangements in which the Inland
Revenue collected the fees and student loan payments. The Scottish Executive may have been able to set up a separate system for fee collection, but it could not opt-out of the reserved arrangements for student loan payments, which at the time began at 9% of income over £10000 per year. It therefore deemed the costs to be greater than the benefits and accepted the lower threshold (until this was raised to £15000 in the UK by the
Higher Education Act 2004).
The administration of EU structural funds also demonstrates strong Treasury power. As Keating (2005: 152) suggests, the European Commission has 'found allies' in regions keen on this additional funding without central government control -particularly since the money granted must be seen to be spent and matched by the recipient region.
However, as Bell and Christie (2001: 147; 2005: 168) discuss, the UK as the member state negotiates the funding and treats this as Treasury money (since the UK is still a net contributor to the EU). So any money granted by the EU to Scotland is paid to the Treasury which includes this payment within the existing Barnett settlement. The result is that not only does Scotland get no more money, but it also has to devote the agreed amount to the relevant project and find matching funding from within its existing budget.
Similar measures may also be used if the Scottish Executive attempts to raise more money through business rates or local authority taxes -the Treasury could merely reduce the Scottish settlement by the same amount and remove the incentive to raise money beyond acceptable limits. As a result, Treasury power in raising money combined with incrementalism (regarding Scotland's existing financial commitments) constrains policy initiation in Scotland if it has a significant spending element (Bell and Christie, 2001; Mitchell, 2004) .
UK Legislation as the default action
This dominance extends to legislation and legislative procedure. As Hazell suggests, Westminster produces more legislation for Scotland than the Scottish Parliament does -50% more bills per annum of primary legislation and double the amount of subordinate legislation. 5 Further, the most common legislative means to address blurred boundaries between reserved and devolved issues has been the use of 'Sewel motions', named after Lord Sewel, the minister responsible for ensuring the progress of the Scotland Bill through the House of Lords in 1998 (Winetrobe, 2001) . The procedure was created in anticipation of a small number of instances in which the UK government would legislate in devolved areas, and a Sewel motion is passed by the Scottish Parliament to give
Westminster the authority to legislate on devolved matters. As Winetrobe (2005) discusses, confusion has arisen over the types of measures taken on the authority of a Sewel motion, since a Westminster Act can also authorise a change in Scottish legislative functions or a change in Scottish Executive functions (to avoid confusion, this article refers to the latter as 'reverse-Sewel' motions since they represent a form of executive devolution rather than a perceived loss of Scottish powers).
As Cairney and Keating (2004) The Bottom-up Narrative: finance, executive devolution and creating policy space
The 'bottom-up' narrative suggests that it is easy to overplay the significance of UK constraints by focussing on a very small number of visible conflicts. Scottish power is more subtle and apparent in less formal arrangements. For example, there is potential to influence UK foreign policy, 6 while the Scottish Executive supplements its limited formal rights in the EU with informal channels of contact and influence (as did the Scottish Office before it -see Bulmer et al, 2002) . Power is also manifest in the level of discretion Scotland enjoys (for example, during the implementation of EU directives).
Day-to-day policy making takes place in the context of financial arrangements conducive to autonomy, while more and more decisions over the detailed direction of policy in reserved areas are devolved to the Scottish Executive. This 'executive devolution' was apparent before political devolution, but it has now been enhanced by the Scottish Parliament's legitimacy and the greater powers granted to Scottish ministers since 1999.
In addition, the example of smoking legislation highlights the scope for reframing issues to ensure venue shift.
The bottom-up narrative suggests that UK disinterest does not equate with dominance. If
Whitehall ministers have 'disentangled themselves from devolution', then scope exists for day-to-day autonomy, particularly since Scotland does not suffer from the lack of investment that Bulpitt (1983: 139) associates with the centre's neglect of the periphery.
While Scotland appears to lose the public arguments over finance, this should be seen within a wider context of spending negotiations. Part of the reason that the Scottish
Executive did not pursue the issue on free personal care is that it received a more favourable response from the Treasury on interest charges for loans for council housing, 'worth more than the amount of attendance allowance at stake' (Trench, 2005: 11 The nature of Barnett allows relative autonomy in Scottish spending and as Midwinter (2004) suggests, since the Scottish budget process would be incremental regardless of the type of funding mechanism, we should examine change at the margins to determine Scottish differences. In this light, Scotland has directed significant levels of funding to other policy areas. Further, since terms such as 'health' and 'education' are so broad, the Scottish Executive can pursue different policies as long as they are broadly in line with Whitehall spending commitments (Midwinter, 2004; Greer, 2004 Such discussions are reminiscent of pre-devolution debates on the existence of a 'Scottish Political System' (Kellas, 1973; Paterson, 1994) . Kellas (1973) (Midwinter et al, 1991) . Many of these arrangements still exist and the unwillingness of the Scottish Executive to 'rock the boat' suggests that it still employs resources to secure favourable policy outcomes in private (for example, the Scottish proportion of the UK spend is still comparable to pre-devolution levels -see Midwinter, 2004) . Further, the increased ability of the Scottish Executive to go its own way on policy allows Scotland to influence UK decisions. Indeed, the example of Hepatitis C is one of a number of policies (including up-front tuition fees, charging volunteers for background firearm checks and tobacco advertising) in which Scottish Executive decisions have 'forced the hand' of UK ministers (Cairney, forthcoming).
Executive Devolution
The Scottish Office and Secretary of State for Scotland were first introduced in the late 19 th century as a symbolic gesture to address nationalistic grievances over the way the Union was handled in London. The office grew much more than anticipated following the precedent set by its introduction -that when Scotland's policy circumstances are different, Scotland's response and administrative arrangements should be different. As a result, although policy was decided at the UK level (with Scottish representation in Cabinet), the power to implement and shape public policy was routinely given to Scottish ministers (Kellas, 1973; Paterson, 1994; Mitchell, 2003; Keating, 2005) . It is in this context that we can view 'reverse-Sewel' motions which describe Westminster Acts altering the functions of Scottish Executive ministers, allowing them to introduce secondary legislation or guidance on specified reserved matters. This type of executive devolution existed before 1999 and was a feature of the initial transfer of functions following the Scotland Act 1998 (see Himsworth, 2004 : para 29 which discusses the main pre-devolution instrument -the Order in Council under s63 of the Scotland Act).
However, there are now significant differences in the use of executive devolution. Most pre-devolution accounts stress the ability to tailor Scottish policy after UK formulation by using the scope afforded by a separate Scottish legal system, administrative structure and need for more time to implement (Cairney, 2002) . There was a lot of consideration of whether the bill would be competent. If (as in Ireland) it was based on the workplace then we could not do it. So it had to be done on public health grounds. We can do a lot of things in this way. There is little you can't get at and a huge raft of things you can do. It effectively comes down to: is there a will? The law is effectively definitional -so one man's workplace is another man's public space (interview, May 2005) There is some debate about the reserved status of smoking, with health ministers in Scotland arguing that this was never an issue in Whitehall and that Scottish Executive legal advice did not present any worries over competence if the bill was restricted to public health language. In this light, smoking is the most prominent example of the use of the 'purpose test' in Scotland to determine the true nature of a piece of legislation.
11
While the legislation affected reserved areas (health and safety; employment), the primary aim of the legislation was to pursue public health measures. The purpose test has also been used more frequently for statutory instruments, suggesting that it has become a routine measure of government (with most blurred boundaries quietly addressed by civil servants). Yet this disguises the extent of reframing required to demonstrate the primacy of purpose, since in other countries the primary driver for a smoking ban has been health and safety. Indeed, when a similar ban was introduced in England a year later, the driver for comprehensive measures was MP concern over the health and safety of bar workers if pubs or private clubs were exempt from legislation.
Combining Narratives: Sewel motions and constrained autonomy
The top-down narrative situates a discussion of Sewel motions within the broader context of UK IGR dominance. They are used routinely, have never been defeated and such defeat would not necessarily stop Westminster from legislating. Yet, this is a political mechanism and the implications of a defeat would be more significant than the constitutional position suggests (Clerking and Reporting Directorate, 2002: 1) . There is also significant debate around Sewel motion initiation and whose interests they serve. Page and Batey (2002: 513) suggest that most policy initiation comes from the 'administration of a UK statute book' since Scotland has a relatively small administration and number of statutes. The Scottish Executive's (unpublished) guidance on Sewel 'makes clear that most proposals for Westminster legislation in the devolved areas come from UK departments rather than Scottish ministers ' (2002: 516) . This proposal comes after the legislative slot has been secured and gives Scotland little time to consider the issue. So while there is no public evidence of unwillingness to cooperate, Scottish ministers 'may find themselves effectively forced to agree to Westminster legislation in the devolved areas' given the uncertainty over devolved government powers and the prospect of the UK government referring the issue to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Page, 2002) . This interpretation contrasts with the Scottish Executive's insistence that most Sewel initiation comes from the Executive. Sewel selection is a pick'n'mix affair following informal contacts and an analysis of upcoming Westminster legislation. 12 While the latter may exaggerate Scottish influence, it is in the interests of both governments for the process to appear seamless, allowing loopholes to be closed and reducing the likelihood of challenge in the courts (Cairney and Keating, 2004) . The
Sewel procedure is a convenient tool for a Scottish Executive short of parliamentary time, in broad agreement with the aims of the legislation, and in some cases anxious not to be seen 'lagging behind' England (Page and Batey, 2002: 513-14) . Therefore, in many ways the Sewel process says more about executive-legislative than UK-Scottish relations and much of the parliamentary criticism of Sewel has arisen because of a perception of the subversion of formal parliamentary process. In other words, while there is a formal element to Sewel motions, their use has reflected the UK intergovernmental style of informal arrangements between executives. Further, the innocuous nature of most motions suggests that UK dominance is rarely a serious issue.
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However, the same can be said for the substance of most reverse-Sewel motions which merely allow Scottish ministers to implement policy established in a Westminster Act
There are often tight parameters on Scottish action (in the Gambling Bill the decisions on the number and location of 'super-casinos' will be made in London), other ways to achieve legislative changes (as in Wales which has similar health profession regulators) and other ways to achieve the same outcomes (as in lottery fund distribution in Scotland). Minister to demonstrate his power on this matter may reflect a maturing and more assertive Scottish Executive, such a step is unusual and may reflect prior agreements with Whitehall which are subject to change (see Cairney, 2006b: 73) . (Cairney, 2006a: 20) .
The example of international aid demonstrates more scope for Scottish initiative if there is political will to be involved and imaginative ways are sought to exploit blurred boundaries. While this matter as a whole is reserved, it is possible to develop a coherent Scottish response based on private fund-raising and using these funds to direct nongovernmental organisations operating abroad without infringing on reserved matters.
However, again, the UK context is important in two ways. First, an extension of formal links between the Scottish Executive and Malawi may require Foreign Office support and Home Office clearance for (for example) medical training in Scotland. Second, the timing for the Malawi initiative coincided with Scotland's hosting of the G8 summit and the UK's strong pursuit of the poverty in Africa agenda. In other words, imaginative ways to work around reserved areas may not be necessary in the case of a devolved government furthering a UK ministerial agenda.
Conclusion
The comparative study of intergovernmental relations suggests that the UK exhibits an unusual combination of features -an asymmetry of population and power, a lack of a supreme constitution and a tendency to work informally through executives. Given the internalisation of decision-making and lack of formal dispute resolution producing 'winners and losers', it is relatively difficult to assess the power of the centre in relation to the periphery. This is compounded by the evidence from multi-level governance -that power is dispersed and policy outcomes are the result of a complex series of negotiations between state and private interests at more than one level of government. In particular, the identification of 'first face' powers to win high profile arguments on reserved and devolved issues is qualified by the exercise of 'second face' powers to reframe policy problems and shift the decision-making venue. Therefore, while the study of IGR is useful in identifying key structures underpinning governmental relations, it does not limit the scope for variation in policy outcomes. As Agranoff (2004: 58) suggests, these vary in reflection of the power of devolved governments to initiate policy without central government constraint and the willingness of both parties to cooperate. To this we can add the strength or visibility of the agenda which affects not only the attention and cooperation from Whitehall, but also the willingness of Scottish ministers to push the limits of the devolution settlement
When the scope for variation of outcomes is so wide, the recourse to empirical investigation is crucial. However, more crucial still is the means to interpret specific results from a wider theoretical viewpoint. Hence the value of narratives as a means of exploring contrasting lenses through which to view IGR. The top-down narrative stresses UK dominance. It suggests that the informal nature of IGR reflects the power of the UK government to disengage from the process of devolution but still reserve the power to decide in high profile cases of disagreement. The use of Sewel motions reflects this dominance, with most issues of blurred boundaries addressed by venue shift back to Westminster and Whitehall. In contrast, the bottom up narrative highlights the discretion afforded by Barnett, the subtle victories on public finance that Scotland enjoys if it avoids confrontation, the extent of executive devolution afforded by Sewel, and the room for policy space if the Scottish Executive is willing to push the boundaries of the devolution settlement. In a sense this is a false or exaggerated debate and a combination of narratives suggests that the Sewel process suits the interests of both parties keen to present an image of 'seamless' devolution. Sewel says more about the relationship between executives and parliaments, demonstrated by the criticisms by both parliaments on the informal nature of IGR even when resolving formal legislative boundaries.
Yet, the value of the narratives is that, when combined with case-study analysis, they highlight the narrow constraints within which Scottish autonomy operates. With nuclear power Scottish discretion is afforded by executive devolution; with asylum we see a lack of Scottish Executive willingness to intervene; and with international aid we see an executive furthering a UK agenda. Even in the most high profile case of Scotland 'reclaiming' a policy area (smoking in public places) we see that the action was underpinned by UK encouragement. Without such encouragement in other aspects of health and safety law the reserved nature of policy has never been successfully challenged. Perhaps ironically, this turns one finding from our introduction on its head.
The distinction between power as capacity and the exercise of power may be used by MLG studies to challenge an assumption of UK power based on its formal structures.
However, it can also be used to undermine the significance of venue shift based on the ability of the Scottish Executive to reframe issues. As Keating (2005: 10) points out, since social work reform is still cited as the key example of autonomy before devolution, perhaps 'not much worth noting had happened since'. It remains to be seen if the limited example of smoking remains the example of autonomy after devolution.
